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THE POLICY-MAKING DYNAMICS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS: A COMMENT ON THE REMARKS OF
GEOFFREY YU
COENRAAD VISSER*
For the sake of brevity, and in line with Mr. Yu's remarks, I shall
comment here only on the intellectual property norm-setting and policy-
making dynamics within the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"). Also, given the theme of this conference as accommodating and
reconciling different national levels of protection, I shall present a perspec-
tive from the South-from the developing countries.
Whether one sees the international intellectual property norm-setting
process as democracy in action or as a multiparty quasi-contractual nego-
tiation, the process should ideally satisfy three conditions: (a) representiv-
ity-all interested parties must be represented in the negotiation of the
intellectual property norms; (b) full information-all those involved in the
negotiation must have full information about the consequences of various
possible outcomes; and (c) non-coercion--one party must not coerce the
others. '
It is conventional wisdom by now that the TRIPS Agreement 2 fell far
short of satisfying these three conditions, and some would argue that nego-
tiations at the World Trade Organization ("WTO") continue to be flawed in
this way.3 Be that as it may, I think that the lasting effect of the "conver-
gence of processes '" 4 that produced the TRIPS Agreement and of the bur-
densome economic impact of the implementation of the Agreement on
developing countries 5 has been to alert these countries to the need for en-
* Professor of Intellectual Property Law and Head of the Department of Mercantile Law, Uni-
versity of South Africa, Pretoria.
1. See PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 14, 190-91 (2002).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, Results of the Uruguay
Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. For an account of the negotiations at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, see, for
example, FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2003).
4. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note I, at 134.
5. J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES I, 4 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds.,
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suring compliance with the above three conditions by any future intellec-
tual property norm-setting or policy-making exercise.
I. REPRESENTIVITY
WIPO is by nature a specialized agency of the United Nations, estab-
lished by convention. 6 Its membership is open to any state that is a member
of the Berne Union or the Paris Union. 7 Norm setting at WIPO accordingly
functions on the basic premise that states, through their governments, rep-
resent all interested parties. Governments of the people are governmentsfor
the people.
As WIPO functions on the "one state, one vote" principle, 8 there is at
least formal compliance with the condition of representivity. Substantively,
however, it is a different story.
The preparatory work for any new international intellectual property
instrument is carried out in any one of the standing committees-currently,
the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents ("SCP"); the Standing
Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographi-
cal Indications; the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights
("SCCR"); and the Standing Committee on Information Technologies
("SCIT").9 Once one of these committees determines that sufficient pro-
gress has been made toward treaty adoption, the WIPO General Assembly
can decide to convene a diplomatic conference. 10 For example, at its last
session the Assembly approved the convening of the Diplomatic Confer-
ence on the Protection of the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations, from
November 19 to December 7, 2007.11
2004) ("For developing countries, the IP issue that TRIPS brings forward is how to pay the US$60
billion a year and how to ensure that they, the developing countries, derive the maximum of foreign
investment.").
6. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 1, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770 [hereinafter WIPO Convention].
7. See id. art. 5. The Berne Union was established by the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works art. 1, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S.
222, and the Paris Union by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 1, Mar.
20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
8. See WIPO Convention, supra note 6, art. 6(3)(a).
9. These committees were created in 1998 by the WIPO Assemblies. See Draft Program and
Budget 1998-1999, WIPO Doc. A/32/2-WO/BC/18/2, Main Program 09 at 87, Main Program 10 at 95,
Sub-program 12.3 at 119-20 (Feb. 9, 1998), approved General Report of the Assemblies of the Member
States, WIPO Doc. A/32/7, 93, 116(ii) (Mar. 27, 1998).
10. See WIPO, Decision-Making Bodies, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/decisionbodies.html
(last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
11. WIPO General Assembly, Report Adopted by the General Assembly, WIPO Doe.
WO/GA/33/10, 107(i) (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter WIPO 2006 Report] (acting on recommenda-
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It is in the technical Standing Committees, then, that most of the
groundwork for new intellectual property norms is done. For the condition
of representivity to be met, all interested parties should be present. Given
that only states (read, governments) can be members of WIPO, there is
again, at best, formal compliance with this condition. For developing coun-
tries, the problem is often that the cost for an expert from home to attend
these meetings in Geneva is prohibitive, and instead a lowly official from
the diplomatic mission in Geneva attends. WIPO is aware of this problem
and thus sponsors a certain number of delegates from developing countries
to attend these meetings.12 But the truth remains that most of the delegates
from developing countries attending Standing Committee meetings are
members of the diplomat corps and are not versed in intellectual property.
Compare these delegations to the well-resourced and technically proficient
delegations of developed countries, such as the United States.
This problem-that members of the diplomatic corps represent devel-
oping countries at Standing Committee meetings-is exacerbated by the
fact that civil society (especially in the guise of nongovernmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs")) can attend these meetings only as observers. 13 Given that
delegations from developing countries generally have very few resources,
NGOs must often give a voice to those intellectual property users directly
affected by proposed new intellectual property norms and policy.
It is against this background that part of what has become known as
the WIPO Development Agenda must be seen.
At its Thirty-First (Fifteenth Extraordinary) Session in September
2004, the WIPO General Assembly considered a proposal by Brazil and
Argentina, 14 supported by Bolivia, Cuba, Domician Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Vene-
zuela, 15 for the establishment of a development agenda for WIPO. Subse-
quently, three Inter-sessional Intergovernmental Meetings ("IIMs") were
tion of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Draft Report, WIPO Doc. SCCR/15/6
Prov. (Dec. 15, 2006)).
12. The funding was provided for in its biennial program and budget. Memorandum of the Direc-
tor General, Proposed Program and Budget 2006-2007, WIPO Doe. A/41/4 (July 20, 2005).
13. For the criteria for admission as an observer, see WIPO, Observers, NGOs, IGOs,
http://www.wipo.int/members/en/admission/observers.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007). For a list of
observers, see WIPO, Intergovernmental Organizations Admitted as Observers to the Meetings of the
Assemblies of the Member States, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/admission/pdf/observers.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2007).
14. WIPO Secretariat, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development
Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004).
15. WIPO Secretariat, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development
Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/1I ADD (Oct. 4, 2004).
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convened to consider a number of proposals. 16 In September to October
2005, the WIPO General Assembly decided to "constitute a Provisional
Committee to take forward the IIM process to accelerate and complete the
discussions on proposals relating to a WIPO Development Agenda."'1 7 The
first session of the Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO
Development Agenda ("PCDA"), was held from February 20-24, 2006;18
the second session, from June 26-30, 2006.19 In all, some Il1 proposals
were tabled.20 After the first PCDA meeting, the proposals were clustered
for future discussion. 21 These clusters will be discussed at two meetings in
2007.22
One of the clustered items recognizes the importance of the represen-
tation of civil society at the negotiating table. It calls upon WIPO to ensure
wider participation of civil society and public interest groups in WIPO's
activities. 23
An example of what could be done to extend representivity can be
found in the context of the work of the Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore ("IGC"), established by the WIPO General Assembly at its
Twenty-Sixth Session.24 This is effectively a forum for international policy
debate and the development of legal mechanisms and practical tools con-
cerning the protection of traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions (folklore), and the intellectual property aspects of access to and
benefit sharing in genetic resources. Since its inception the Committee has
consulted widely, and, in 2005, it successfully sought the establishment of
16. These meetings were held in Geneva from April I Ito 13, 2005, WIPO, Inter-Sessional Inter-
governmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, First Session, Geneva, Apr. 11-13, 2005,
Report, WIPO Doc. IIM/I/6 (Aug. 18, 2005); from June 20 to 22, 2005, WIPO, Inter-Sessional Inter-
governmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, Second Session, Geneva, June 20-22,
2005, Report, WIPO Doc. IIM/2/10 (Sept. 1, 2005); and from July 20 to 22, 2005, WIPO, Inter-
Sessional Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, Third Session, Geneva,
July 20-22, 2005, Report, WIPO Doe. 11M/3/3 (Sept. 16, 2005).
17. WIPO General Assembly, Report Adopted by the General Assembly, 146, WIPO Doe.
WO/GA/32/13 (Oct. 5, 2005) [hereinafter WIPO 2005 Report].
18. See WIPO, Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda
(PCDA), First Session, Geneva, Feb. 20-24, 2006, Report Adopted by the Meeting, WIPO Doc.
PCDA/1/6 (July 3, 2006) [hereinafter WIPO PCDA (1) Report].
19. See WIPO, Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda
(PCDA), Second Session, Geneva, June 26-30, 2006, Report Adopted by the Meeting, WIPO Doe.
PCDA/2/4 (Sept. 18, 2006).
20. See WIPO PCDA (1) Report, supra note 18, Annex I.
21. See id.
22. See WIPO 2006 Report, supra note 11, 66.
23. See id. Annex A, 38.
24. See WIPO General Assembly, Report Adopted by the Assembly, 71, WIPO Doe.
WO/GA/26/10 (Oct. 3, 2000) [hereinafter WIPO 2000 Report].
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the Voluntary Contribution Fund for Accredited Indigenous and Local
Communities to further facilitate the participation of indigenous and local
communities in the work of the Committee.25
II. FULL INFORMATION
The condition of full information, then, requires that all those involved
in the negotiation have full information about the consequences of various
possible outcomes.
Given the fact that delegations from developing countries are more of-
ten than not under resourced, it almost goes without saying that these coun-
tries find it difficult to determine the possible economic and social impact
of new intellectual property norms and policies. Again, the assistance of
civil society (especially NGOs and intergovernmental organizations, such
as the United Nations Scientific, Cultural and Education Organization and
the World Health Organization) for developing countries in the provision
of such information is indispensable.
At the third IIM, the African Group submitted a proposal that further
touches upon this issue.26 The Group proposed, inter alia, the use of impact
assessments as part of the technical assistance rendered to developing
countries 27 and "studies to determine the tangible costs and benefits of IP
protection." 28
Some of the clustered items for discussion in 2007 relate directly to
the condition of full information. For example, Cluster B (Norm Setting,
Flexibilities, Public Policy, and Public Domain) includes a proposal that
"norm-setting activities recognize the different levels of development of
Member States and reflect a balance between benefits and costs of any
initiative for developed and developing countries, '29 and that WIPO,
through its Advisory Committee on Enforcement, "conduct analyses of the
relationship between high rates of counterfeiting and intellectual property
piracy and technology transfer, foreign direct investment and economic
growth."' 30 Likewise, Cluster D (Assessments, Evaluation and Impact Stud-
ies) includes requests that WIPO undertake studies to demonstrate the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural impact of the use of intellectual property
25. See WIPO 2005 Report, supra note 17, 168.
26. See WIPO Secretariat, Proposal by Morocco on Behalf of the African Group Entitled "The
African Proposal for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO," WIPO Doc. IIM/3/2
Rev. (July 31, 2005).
27. See id. Annex, at 4.
28. Id. Annex, at 5.
29. WIPO 2006 Report, supra note 11, Annex A, 19.
30. Id. Annex B, 22.
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systems in Member States3 1 and to "deepen the analysis of the implications
and benefits of a rich and accessible public domain. ' 32 Also, there are pro-
posals for WIPO "[t]o establish an independent development impact as-
sessment with respect to technical assistance, technology transfer, and
norm-setting on developing and least developed countries (LDCs), '3 3 "[t]o
undertake independent, evidence-based 'Development Impact Assess-
ments"' with respect to the organization's norm-setting activities, 34 and to
"compile empirical evidence and carry out cost-benefit [analyses] that con-
sider, inter alia, alternatives within and outside the IP system."35
The request for impact assessment studies as part of information gath-
ering during the negotiating process for new international intellectual prop-
erty norms is not without precedent. At its first session, in the course of its
discussion of a possible international instrument for the protection of
nonoriginal databases, 36 SCCR recommended that the International Bureau
of WIPO commission a study on the economic impact of the protection of
databases on developing countries, especially LDCs. 37 Three years later,38
in 2001, WIPO commissioned five studies on such impact on developing
countries and the so-called countries in transition. These studies were pre-
sented to the SCCR in May of 2002. 39
31. Id. Annex A, 31.
32. Id. Annex A, 32.
33. Id. Annex B, 54.
34. ld. Annex B, 61.
35. Id. Annex B, 62.
36. See WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions,
Geneva, Dec. 2-20, 1996, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Databases to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996); WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions, Geneva, Dec. 2-20, 1996, Recommendation Concerning Databases, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/100 (Dec. 23, 1996); Memorandum of the Director General, Preparatory Work on a Treaty
Concerning Intellectual Property in Databases, 3, WIPO Doc. AB/XXX/3 (Jan. 20, 1997).
37. See Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Report Adopted by the Standing
Committee, I 204(b)(ii), WIPO Doc. SCCR/1/9 (Nov. 10, 1998).
38. Ghana, for example, had already expressed concern at the slow progress made with commis-
sioning the study. Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Report Adopted by the Stand-
ing Committee, 76-77, WIPO Doc. SCCR/I/9 (Dec. 1, 1999). According to the WIPO Secretariat,
"[c]ommissioning the study had turned out to be a difficult issue, especially regarding a well-balanced
selection of appropriate institutions and/or experts." Id. 77.
39. See Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Economic Impact of Database
Protection in Developing Countries and Countries in Transition, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/2 (Apr. 4, 2002)
(prepared by Yale M. Braunstein) (study tabled at the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, Geneva, May 13-17, 2002); Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights, Study on the Protection of Unoriginal Databases, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/3 (Apr. 4, 2002)
(prepared by Sherif EI-Kassas) (tabled at the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee on Copyright
and Related Rights, Geneva, May 13-17, 2002); Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights,
Economic Impact of the Protection of Unoriginal Databases in Developing Countries and Countries in
Transition, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/4 (Apr. 4, 2002) (prepared by Thomas Riis) (study tabled at the Sev-
enth Session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Geneva, May 13-17, 2002);
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IIl. NON-COERCION
The condition of non-coercion simply means that one party should not
coerce any other party into agreeing to new international intellectual prop-
erty norms. Coercion is the opposite of negotiation, of course.
The condition of non-coercion has various facets.
Sufficient consensus as to entry into force: The number of countries
required to have ratified a new international intellectual property instru-
ment in order for it to enter into force has become an important device to
ensure a second level (round) of consensus-sufficient international con-
sensus that a new instrument should enter into force. The 1996 WIPO
"Internet treaties" both set a fairly high number-they entered into force
only after thirty instruments of ratification had been deposited with the
Director General. 40 At the Diplomatic Conference, the political (non-
coercion) argument advanced by developing countries was that these trea-
ties should enter into force only when there was sufficient consensus (in the
sense of consensus between a fair mix of developed and developing coun-
tries) that they should do S0.41 If the figure were set too low, developed
countries could swiftly have brought these treaties into force.
Regime shifting: While it is true that developing countries have re-
cently seen regime shifting "as a bulwark against the established power
balance in international lawmaking, '42 at WIPO developed countries have
on occasion used regime shifting to remove from the treaty-making process
developing countries' proposals that threaten industrial interests of devel-
oped countries. 43 In this sense, regime shifting strains against the condition
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, A Study on the Impact of Protection of Unorigi-
nal Databases on Developing Countries: Indian Experience, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/5 (Apr. 4, 2002)
(prepared by Phiroz Vandrevala) (tabled at the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee on Copy-
right and Related Rights, Geneva, May 13-17, 2002); Standing Committee on Copyright and Related
Rights, The Economic Impact of the Protection of Database in China, WIPO Doe. SCCR/7/6 (Apr. 22,
2002) (prepared by Zheng Shengli) (study tabled at the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, Geneva, May 13-17, 2002).
40. See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 20, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT] (entered into force on Mar. 6, 2002);
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 29, Dec. 20, 1996,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT] (entered into force on May 20,
2002).
41. See WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions,
Geneva, Dec. 2-20, 1996, 57-75, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/103 (Aug. 26, 1997).
42. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 121 (2004); accord Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking,
29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 13-18 (2004).
43. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 565 (2000) ("Forum-
shifting is a strategy that only the powerful.., can use.").
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of non-coercion. A pertinent example: at the third session of the SCP, Co-
lombia proposed the insertion into the draft Patent Law Treaty 44 of a prior
informed consent notification requirement with respect to biological and
genetic resources.45 The developed countries (notably the United States, the
European Commission, Japan, and South Korea) were fiercely opposed to
the proposal, which was seen as a potential "treaty breaker. '46 The issue of
biopiracy 47 was moved to another forum,48 where there was no danger of
an informed consent notification requirement finding its way into the
treaty. This issue eventually ended up on the agenda of the IGC. 49 Despite
initial enthusiasm for the IGC, 50 and commendable activities undertaken by
the committee in connection with the protection of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge, it remains little more than a "talk shop," from which
anything resembling treaty language still has to emerge. The speed with
which broadcasters' rights have moved in the SCCR to a diplomatic con-
ference, when compared with the pace of norm setting in the IGC, tells the
story.
Tradeoffs: International intellectual property norm setting invariably
involves a process of tradeoffs-of give and take-between interest
groups, and between countries, often driven by interest groups. Developed
countries, generally net exporters of intellectual property, are often mindful
mainly of the interests of intellectual property holders. Developing coun-
44. The treaty was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the Adoption of the Patent Law
Treaty, held in Geneva from May II to June 2, 2000. Memorandum of the WIPO International Bureau,
Report on the Outcome of the Diplomatic Conference on the Adoption of the Patent Law Treaty, 4,
WIPO Doc. A/35/12 (Aug. 7,2000).
45. See Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Protection of Biological and Genetic Re-
sources Proposal by the Delegation of Colombia, 2, WIPO Doc. SCP/3/10 (Sept. 8, 1999).
46. See Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Report Adopted by the Standing Committee,
205, WIPO Doc. SCP/3/l I (Sept. 14, 1999) [hereinafter SCP 1999 Report]. Thirteen developing
countries spoke in favor of the Colombian proposal. See id.
47. The term "biopiracy," generally, refers either to "the unauthorized commercial use of biologi-
cal resources and/or associated [traditional knowledge] from developing countries, or to the patenting of
spurious inventions based on such knowledge or resources without compensation." Graham Dutfield,
TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 233, 237 n.16 (2001).
48. The Standing Committee on the Law of Patents agreed to the following:
Recognizing the importance of biological and genetic resources, the SCP invites the Interna-
tional Bureau to include on the agenda of the Working Group on Biotechnological Inventions,
to be convened at WIPO in November, 1999, the issue of protection of biological and genetic
resources. The SCP further invites the International Bureau to take steps to convene a separate
meeting involving a larger number of Member States early in 2000, to consider that issue.
SCP 1999 Report, supra note 46, 208.
49. Further on this process, see Heifer, supra note 42, at 69-70.
50. See WIPO 2000 Report, supra note 24, 28-69. Forty developing countries and developed
countries such as France (speaking on behalf of the members of the European Union) and Japan (speak-
ing on behalf of Group B) supported the new committee. See id.
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tries, generally net importers of intellectual property, are generally mindful
mainly of the interests of intellectual property users.
In the WIPO context, tradeoffs take mainly two forms. 5 1
With intra-regime tradeoffs, the new international instrument provides
for both the enhancement of intellectual property protection (for example,
by the creation of new rights for intellectual property holders) and the limi-
tation of such protection in certain instances (usually by providing for ex-
ceptions and limitations to these rights). The problem for developing
countries is that the exceptions and limitations are usually made subject to
the three-step test of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. 52 Thus, the ma-
jor extension of the rights of intellectual property holders, usually by the
creation of new exclusive rights of authorization, is hardly balanced by the
narrowly circumscribed exceptions allowed by the three-step test. As a
result, the already precarious balance of intellectual property interests is
usually skewed further in favor of the exporters of intellectual property-
the developed countries.
With inter-regime tradeoffs, one typically deals with linkages between
various regimes. The effect of these tradeoffs or linkages is usually to ad-
vance the interests of different groups at the same time; the advancement of
the interests of one group is made conditional upon the advancement of the
interests of the other. Conversely, the absence of such a tradeoff or linkage
may deprive an interest group of the leverage necessary to induce another
interest group into agreeing to norms that advance the interests of the for-
mer. The relationship between the groups may be immediate or remote.
An example of the effect of the absence of a tradeoff between imme-
diate interest groups: the failure of the Diplomatic Conference on the Pro-
tection of Audiovisual Performances 5 3 to reach agreement on the text of a
treaty54 to enhance the protection of audiovisual performers can perhaps
51. This classification is an adaptation of part of the classification of tradeoffs at the national
lawmaking level proposed by Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 104-09.
52. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 13; WCT, supra note 40, art. 10; WPPT, supra note
40, art. 16. For a succinct analysis of this test, see, for example, MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION, paras. 5.55-5.57 (2002); Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights,
WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environ-
ment, WIPO Doc. SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003) (prepared by Sam Ricketson).
53. The Conference was convened by WIPO in Geneva from December 7 to 20, 2000. Memoran-
dum of the Director General, Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances,
WIPO Doc. A/36/9 (June 18, 2001) [hereinafter WIPO 2001 Memorandum].
54. Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances, Geneva, Dec. 7-20,
2000, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of an Instrument on the Protection ofAudiovisual
Performances to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. IAVP/DC/3 (Aug. 1, 2000).
The treaty breaker was the proposed Article 12 on ownership and transfer of rights. WIPO 2001 Memo-
randum, supra note 53, 2.
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best be explained by the fact that in the WIPO Copyright Treaty audiovis-
ual producers had already received extended copyright protection. 55 Thus,
the audiovisual performers had nothing to trade for their own extended
protection.
An example of the effect of the presence of a tradeoff (more properly,
a linkage) between remote interest groups: the African Group has sought to
link the protection of nonoriginal databases and the protection of traditional
knowledge and folklore. 56 While this link is perplexing when one thinks
only in terms of subject matter, it makes sense on an economic level, given
the relative importance of the subject matter to developed and developing
countries. Although, ideally, each new intellectual property norm-setting or
policy-making initiative should be judged on its own merits, the realpolitik
is that developing countries often have no choice but to resort to this type
of tradeoff to advance their own intellectual property interests.
CONCLUSION
Although intellectual property norm setting and policy-making at
WIPO at first blush meets the conditions of representivity, full information,
and non-coercion, the reality is different. As a result of systemic limitations
inherent in the nature of the organization and the way it functions, and of
economic and political realities, the norm-setting and policy-making proc-
ess at WIPO is skewed in favor of developed countries. It is against this
background that the WIPO Development Agenda must be seen-it is an
attempt to extend the organization's compliance with these three above-
mentioned conditions. If the Agenda were to succeed, developing countries
could look forward to participating one day in a process where they are
substantively equal partners of the developed countries.
55. See WCT, supra note 40, arts. 8, 10-12, n.1 (Agreed statement concerning Article 1(4)).
56. Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Report of the Regional Roundtable for
African Countries on the Protection of Databases and on the Protection of the Rights of Broadcasting
Organizations, Held in Cotonou, from June 22 to 24, 1999, 7, WIPO Doc. SCCR/3/2 (July 30, 1999);
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Report Adopted by the Standing Committee,
76, WIPO Doc. SCCR/3/11 (Dec. 1, 1999).
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